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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 970483-CA

:

HONG NGUYEN,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery,
a first degree felony (reduced to second degree felony) , in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995), in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (Supp.
1997) .
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARD OF REVIEW
Was aggravated robbery established by evidence that defendant
brandished a screwdriver and threatened to kill a car owner who
interrupted defendant's vehicle burglary?
"In a jury trial in a criminal proceeding, [this Court will]
review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict." State
v. Ortiz. 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted),

cert, denied.795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).

It will "reverse a jury

conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
This case involves the following statutes, which are reproduced
in addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (Supp. 1996);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1996);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2)(d) (Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Information with aggravated robbery,
a first degree felony (R. 6). At trial, the jury was instructed
on aggravated robbery and the lesser included offense of burglary
of a vehicle, a class A misdemeanor (R. 68-69, 76) .

The jury

convicted defendant as charged (R. 77).
On defendant's uncontested motion, the court entered a judgment
of conviction for a second degree felony and sentenced defendant
accordingly (R. 86-89). Defendant timely appealed (R. 95, 97-98).

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
At about 1 a.m. one morning, Robert Carper drove to the Westerner
Club to give a friend a ride home (R. Ill: 45-46) . He parked near
the club, met his friend inside, then walked back to the parking
lot to get his car (R. Ill: 46-47).

As he approached his parked

car, he noticed a figure inside it (R. Ill: 47). When he reached
the car, he saw defendant inside trying the pry the car stereo out
with a screwdriver (R. Ill: 48, 54, 70). 2
Carper demanded to know what defendant "thought he was doing";
defendant turned around, "brandished a screwdriver" by pointing it
at Carper, and told him to "back off or he would kill [him]" (R.
Ill: 48-49, 57-58).

Carper took the threat seriously and backed

off about four feet (R. Ill: 49, 70).
Defendant climbed out of the window and "kind of swung the
screwdriver" at Carper, missing him by about a foot (R. Ill: 4 9-51) .
Carper again backed off and kicked defendant in the chest to "keep
him away from me" (R. Ill: 50, 71) . Defendant then "took off running"
(R. Ill: 50-51).
Carper pursued defendant and eventually pushed or knocked him
to the ground (R. Ill: 51, 68, 76). A security guard then intervened,
1

Except as noted, facts are stated in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1205-06 (Utah 1993); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah
1989).
2

Defendant had entered the car by throwing a rock through
the window (R. Ill: 48, 52-53).
3

handcuffing defendant and retrieving the screwdriver from the gutter
nearby (R. Ill: 51, 77-80).

It was a standard screwdriver, about

six inches long, with a wooden handle (R. Ill: 79, 86).
Carper never lost sight of defendant from the moment he saw
him in the car until Carper apprehended him (R. Ill: 54). 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State introduced credible, uncontroverted testimony supporting
every element of the crime of aggravated robbery.

Even assuming

arguendo the truth of defendant's contentions, they succeed in showing
only that his conduct fell outside the popular stereotype of
aggravated robbery as a stickup.
ARGUMENT
REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE THAT THE ELEMENTS OF
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WERE SATISFIED BY UNCONTROVERTED
TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT BRANDISHED A SCREWDRIVER AND
THREATENED TO KILL A CAR OWNER WHO INTERRUPTED DEFENDANT' S
VEHICLE BURGLARY
Defendant claims that the trial evidence was insufficient to
establish his "intent to commit aggravated robbery" and that his
"actions do not constitute the sort of violent armed encounter
contemplated by the aggravated robbery statute." Br. Aplt. at 6.

3

Although defense counsel's cross-examination dwelt on a
set of keys that Carper found in his car (see R. Ill: 61-66, 7374), the keys were not introduced by either party and had no
significance in the case. Any slight relevance the keys might
have had, had the State or the defense chosen to introduce them,
would have gone to defendant's identity and not, as defendant now
claims, to his intent. See Br. Aplt. at 12 n.7.
4

He asks this Court to reverse his conviction for aggravated robbery
and "enter judgment for the lesser included offense of burglary of
a vehicle."

I£.; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (1995).

"In a jury trial in a criminal proceeding, [this Court will]
review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict." State
v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted),
cert, denied,795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).

It will "reverse a jury

conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id.
A.

Reasonable minds could easily conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the trial evidence satisfied
the elements of aggravated robbery.

Robbery. A person commits robbery if "the person intentionally
or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another
in the course of committing a theft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (b)
(Supp. 1996).4

An act is committed "*in the course of committing

a theft' if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of
theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission."
Utah Code Ann. § § 76-6-301(2) (Supp. 1996) (see addendum A for full
text of statute).

4

The jury was instructed on this alternative of robbery
(see R. 68).
5

The perpetrator' s intent "need not be proved by direct evidence,"
State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 119 (UtahApp. 1992) (citations omitted),
but "may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the accused, the
nature of the weapon used by defendant and manner in which it was
used, taken together with all the other circumstances in the case."
State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1982), overruled in part
on other grounds bv State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 848 n.5 (Utah 1992) .
Uncontroverted trial evidence established that, when Carper
confronted defendant, defendant had broken into Carper's car and
was attempting to pry the car stereo loose with a screwdriver. See
p. 3 herein.

From this testimony the jury could reasonably infer

that defendant was "in the course of committing a theft" when he
pointed the screwdriver at Robert Carper and threatened to kill him.
Indeed, defendant does not contest this conclusion. See Br. Aplt.
at 15-16.
Uncontroverted

evidence

also

established

that

defendant

"brandished" the screwdriver, pointed it at Carper, and threatened
to kill him.

See p. 3 herein.

Carper took the threat seriously

and backed off about four feet. Id. After getting out of the car,
defendant swung the screwdriver at Carper, missing him by about a
foot, and causing Carper to back off again. Jd.
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that
defendant "intentionally or knowingly" used the fear of immediate
force against Carper.

Indeed, the conclusion seems inescapable.
6

Nothing in the trial testimony would support a contrary inference,
that is, that defendant's threat to kill Carper with the screwdriver
was innocent (e.g., joking), accidental, negligent, or reckless.
The evidence was therefore sufficient to convict defendant of
robbery.
Dangerous weapon. A robbery is aggravated if the perpetrator
"uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon" in the course of
committing the robbery.

§ 76-6-302 (1995).

The definitional section of Utah's criminal code defines
"dangerous weapon" in part as an "item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (a) (Supp. 1996) .
Also instructive is Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2)(d) (Supp.
1996).5 It defines "dangerous weapon" in terms of use: a "dangerous
weapon" is "any item that in the manner of its use or intended use
is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury."

Id.

Similarly, one factor for determining whether an item "not commonly
known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon" is "the manner
in which the instrument, object, or thing was used." Utah Code Ann.

5

Although Utah Code Ann. § '76-10-501(2)(d) (Supp. 1996)
defines "dangerous weapon" for purposes of weapons offenses, the
Utah Supreme Court has cited it in determining whether a
screwdriver was a "dangerous weapon" for purposes of the
aggravated assault statute. See State v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874,
874 (Utah 1988) (per curiam). Defendant also tacitly concedes
its relevance. See Br. Aplt. at 9.
7

§ § 76-10-501(2) (d) (iii) (Supp. 1996).

(See addendum A for full

text of statutes.)
When a screwdriver is used as a weapon, such as when it is held
to a rape victim's neck, a jury is fully justified in concluding
that it is a "'dangerous weapon" under these statutes.

See State

v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874, 874 (Utah 1988) (affirming aggravated sexual
assault conviction).

See also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660

(Utah 1985) ("tools such as knives and screwdrivers . . . [may] be
used as weapons") (citation omitted).
Here, defendant used a standard screwdriver, about six inches
long, with a wooden handle (R. Ill: 79, 86) .6 He used it as a weapon,
threatening to kill Carper and even attempting to stab him with it.
On these facts, the jury acted reasonably and lawfully in concluding
that the screwdriver qualified as a "dangerous weapon."
The evidence was therefore sufficient to convict defendant of
aggravated robbery.
B.

Defendant's arguments do not address the statutory
elements of the crime.

Defendant contends that he did not threaten Carper "in order
to unlawfully seize'' his property; that he "did not employ the
screwdriver against Carper in order to gain initial access to the
Camaro and did not produce the screwdriver for the sole purpose of

6

Although for unexplained reasons the screwdriver was not
offered at trial, there was no disagreement as to its description
or the effect its use had on Carper.
8

threatening Carper"; that "Carper did not view the screwdriver as
enough of a threat to deter him from verbally and physically
challenging" defendant; that an enraged Carper had to be separated
from defendant; that defendant went to the crime scene intending
11

at most, to break into Carper's car" and not to commit aggravated

robbery; that defendant "in no measure contemplated an armed
encounter"; that he did not commit "a violent assault upon a victim
by use of a weapon in order to unlawfully steal the victim's
property"; that other aggravated robberies involved more "egregious
and violent behavior"; that defendant hoped "to avoid a personal
encounter"; that defendant "never actually touched Carper's person";
and that "the screwdriver is not an inherently dangerous weapon of
force, the very presence of which justifies a conviction of aggravated
robbery."

Br. Aplt. at 9-14.

Even assuming arguendo the truth of these contentions, they
miss the point. None of these factors are elements of aggravated
robbery. Defendant succeeds in showing only that his conduct fell
outside the popular stereotype of aggravated robbery as a stickup.7
7

Defendant's attempt to paint his victim as the aggressor
and blame the victim for defendant's death threat and stabbing
attempt, see Br. Aplt. at 14, fails to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
Defendant brandished the screwdriver and issued his death
threat—thus completing the crime of aggravated robbery—in
response to Carper's asking, "what do you think you're doing?"
(R. Ill: 49), an appropriate question under the circumstances.
Similarly, that Carper would defend himself with his feet when
attacked with a screwdriver does not justify defendant's conduct.
A person "engaged in stealing another person's property" may
(continued...)
9

Similarly, that additional evidence might have been "pertinent
and helpful," Br. Aplt. at 12, is not the test of the sufficiency
of evidence. All that is required is that the evidence adduced at
trial be sufficient to convict, which here it was.
Defendant also contests the "aggravated" character of his
conviction, arguing that on these facts an "aggravated robbery
conviction does not

serve the statutory distinction between

^aggravated' offenses and less egregious conduct . . ." Br. Aplt.
at 12-13.

On the contrary, the "statutory distinction" between

aggravated robbery and simple robbery rests on legislatively
enumerated factors, one of which is the use or threatened use of
a dangerous weapon. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) (1995).

The

jury was not, and should not have been, asked to determine how
"egregious" they believed defendant's conduct to be.
In any event, this claim is ironic in light of the trial court's
order reducing his conviction from a first to a second degree felony
(R. Ill: 86-89); see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995).

Defendant

was sentenced as if he had committed only simple robbery. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-301(3) (Supp. 1996).

7

(...continued)
expect "that another person will appear unexpectedly and object
strenuously." State v. Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App.
1992) (quoting Carter, 707 P.2d at 660).
10

C.

Because he was properly convicted of aggravated robbery,
defendant is not entitled to have his conviction reduced
to burglary of a vehicle.

Defendant claims that his conviction should be reversed and
this Court should enter judgment for burglary of a vehicle, a class
A misdemeanor.

See Br. Aplt. at 15-16; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204

(1995) . Because his conviction for aggravated robbery is supported
by the evidence, defendant is not entitled to this relief.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's aggravated robbery conviction should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the
State does not request that it be set for oral argument or that a
published opinion issue.
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LfcFebruary 1998

RESPECTFULLY submitted on ^H_

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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JR.

Assistant Attorney General

11
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Addendum A

76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act* means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor* means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in
a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other
manner that he is in control of such an item.
(6) "Offense* means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act
and the actor is capable of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess* means to have physical possession of or to exercise
dominion or control over tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death.
(11) "Substantial bodily injury* means bodily injury, not amounting to
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain,
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily member or organ.
(12) "Writing* or "written* includes any handwriting, typewriting,
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being
preserved.
History; C. 1953, 76-1-601, enacted hf L. redesignated fonner Subsections (5Xa) and (b)
1973, eh. 196, f 76-1-601; 1939, eh. 170,1 1; as (5XbXi) and (ii), and made related changes.
1995, eh. 244, t 1* 1995, eh. 291, | 1; 1996,
The 1995 amendment by ch. 291, effective
ch. 205, | 26.
May 1,1995, added Subsection (11).
Amendment Notes. — Hie 1995 amendThe 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
ment by ch. 244, effecthre May 1,1995, added 1996, added Subsection (12) and made a stylisthe subsection designations in Subsection (5), ic change.

76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-301, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, S 76-6-301; 1995, ch. 222, 9 1*
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment. effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsection (1), which had read "Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property

in the possession of anotherfromhis person, or
immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear," added Subsection (2), and redesignated former Subsection^
(2) as (3).

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of «r*^
robbery, he:
(a) uses i
•
'ansrerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon,,, another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
ccnirse of committing a robbery if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediateflightafter the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

71 i J I

II

CRIMINAL CODE

96

PARTS
WEAPONS
76-10 501. Uniform law

1 Mi mil ion si

(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally
protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws
throughout the state. Except as specifically provided by state law, a citizen
of the United States or a lawfully admitted alien shall not be:
(i) prohibited from owning, possessing, purchasing, transporting,
or keeping anyfirearmat his place of residence, property, business, or
in any vehicle under his control; or
(ii) required to have a permit or license to purchase, own, possess,
transport, or keep a firearm,
(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this state and in all its
political subdivisions and municipalities. All authority to regulate firearms shall be reserved to the state except where the Legislature specifically delegates responsibility to local authorities. Unless specifically
authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local authority may not enact
or enforce any ordinance, regulation, or rule pertaining to firearms.
(2) As used in this part:
(a) (i) "Concealed dangerous weapon" means a dangerous weapon that
is covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not
be aware of its presence and is readily accessible for immediate use.
(ii) A dangerous weapon shall not be considered a concealed dangerous weapon if it is afirearmwhich is unloaded and is securely
encased.
(b) "Crime of violence" means aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a
dangerous weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or an attempt ta. commit any of these
offenses.
(c) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background
check conducted by a licensed firearms dealer on every purchaser of a
handgun through the division or the local law enforcement agency where
thefirearmsdealer conducts business.
(d) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The
following factors shall be used in determining whether a knife, or any
other item, object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon
is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any;
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used;
and
(iv) the other lawful purposes fin wit
instrument, object in
thing may be used.
(e) "Dealer* means every person who is licensed under crimes and
criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling,
leasing, or otherwise transferring a handgun, whether the person is a
retail or wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise.

